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17 February 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT: Comments on Representative Lindsay's article in the
March 1964 issue of Esquire Magazine

1. The tone of the article seeks to convey an impression of a high-minded, objective inquiry into the role of CIA. In truth, it damns CIA by innuendo. The "message" of the article can be summarized in three points:

a. The need to control "the explosive nature of the CIA's operational involvement in international politics."

b. The need to control CIA in the production of national intelligence because it is both "player and umpire" and it tends "to carry its special institutional tendencies into the shaping of American foreign policy."

c. Only Congress can alleviate "the difficulties of unchecked power in the intelligence community." A Joint Committee must be established, however, because CIA is now monitored only "in theory" by "four small subcommittees" whose members "have relatively low status," little time, and great difficulty in dividing jurisdiction among each other.

2. All the internal evidence indicates that the article was written by someone in the Executive Branch familiar with both the intelligence community and the full range of State-CIA relationships:

a. The author is familiar with the USIB, the Board of National Estimates, the writings of Sherman Kent, and the fine points revolving about the DCI's dual role.

b. The author is familiar with the "Herter-Dulles agreement," the President's letter to the Ambassadors in the spring of 1961, and the Taylor committee's investigation in 1961.

c. The author is a civilian with an anti-military bias. He complains about CIA's hiring of retired military officers who have "an instinctive tendency to take a rather narrow. . . view of the problems." The line about DIA being largely responsible for current intelligence was probably deliberately thrown in to throw us off the scent.

d. In short, someone in State wrote Lindsay's article. The internal evidence points that way. In addition, in my own extensive experience with State, I have personally heard the same arguments from their lips, even some of the same words. For example, the current terminological fad of the anti-CIA clique in State is to object to CIA's "shaping" of foreign policy.

3. The author denies inside knowledge, but he protests too much: "These premises, like all of my remarks in this article, arise only from material and information available to the public. . . ." However, the author has a much clearer insight than does the general public or the newspaper fraternity. Nor is the article written in the usual dogmatic style of half-informed journalists and Congressmen. Rather, we find a hesitant way of expressing things, as though the author knew better than to fully endorse what has appeared in the press, yet determined to use these press allegations to set up his straw man. Thus: "the criticism most frequently heard. . ."; "the charge has been made. . ."; "it has been alleged. . ."; "it became clear. . ."; "responsible representatives of the press have reported. . ."; "the CIA appears to have. . . ."

4. This article is different than previous ones, like Senator McCarthy's, in another important respect. The author never raises such questions as "who authorized the Guatemalan operation? the Iranian operation?" He is obviously aware of the existence of the Special Group. He doesn't accuse us so much of "making" as of "shaping" foreign policy. CIA comes off pretty well on Guatemala, but on Iran, there is a clear implication that the operation was carried out to save U.K. and U.S. oil interests.

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